My intellectual heroes include:-
Bertrand Russell, Karl Popper, Thomas Szasz, Noam Chomsky, Karen Armstrong and Kenan Malik.
Bertrand Russell, Karl Popper, Thomas Szasz, Noam Chomsky, Karen Armstrong and Kenan Malik.
EXEMPLAR HUMANAE VITAE - SPECIMEN OF A HUMAN LIFE. I am not really a sofa. But I try to be a filosofa. This is the parent blog of my other blogs which all began here, and which in totality constitute the views of an urban peasant living in London. Including some thoughts on politics, psychology, religion, employment and education. And a little humour. I am a rationalist, a humanist and an atheist and I write from a green/socialist/libertarian perspective.
22 October 2018
12 May 2018
"Divide and Rule" is not dead
"Divide and Rule" is not dead.
A rival think-tank - the right-wing "Resolution Foundation" - has seriously spoken of giving young people large financial handouts when they become 25. This is supposedly because the "social contract" between the generations has broken down.
There is no social contract between the generations. What nonsense!
It is incredible that this nonsense made the front page of the Guardian - supposedly the most radical of the mainstream papers.
It is highly unlikely to happen, and is an example of government by the media and diversion by the media.
"Divide and Rule" is not dead. In this case dividing society by generations. A new trick.
The housing crisis is caused by the abandonment of social democratic principles.
Not by any difference between the generations.
Poverty exists in all generations.
A rival think-tank - the right-wing "Resolution Foundation" - has seriously spoken of giving young people large financial handouts when they become 25. This is supposedly because the "social contract" between the generations has broken down.
There is no social contract between the generations. What nonsense!
It is incredible that this nonsense made the front page of the Guardian - supposedly the most radical of the mainstream papers.
It is highly unlikely to happen, and is an example of government by the media and diversion by the media.
"Divide and Rule" is not dead. In this case dividing society by generations. A new trick.
The housing crisis is caused by the abandonment of social democratic principles.
Not by any difference between the generations.
Poverty exists in all generations.
1 May 2018
Thomas Szasz essay, 1979.
"Male and Female Created He Them" by Thomas Szasz. 1979.
IN the old days, when I was a medical student, if a man wanted to have his penis amputated, my psychology professors said that he suffered from schizophrenia, locked him up in an asylum and threw away the key. Now that I am a professor. my colleagues in psychiatry say that he is a “transsexual,” my colleagues in urology refashion his penis into a perineal cavity they call a vagina, and Time magazine puts him on its cover and calls him “her.” Anyone who doubts that this is progress is considered to be ignorant of the discoveries of modern psychiatric sexology, and a political reactionary, a sexual bigot, or something equally unflattering.
Like much of the medical‐psychiatric mendacity characteristic of our day, the official definition “transsexualism” as a disease comes down to the strategic abuse of language — epitomized by confusing and equating biological phenomena with social roles (in the present case, chromosomal sexual identity with acting as a man or a woman). Although there are connections between these concepts and facts, neither one “causes'.’ or “determines” the other.
Because “transsexualism” involves, is indeed virtually synonymous with, extensive surgical alterations of the “normal” human body, we might ask what would happen, say, to a man who went to an orthopedic surgeon, told him that he felt like a right‐handed person trapped in an ambidextrous body and asked the doctor to cut off his perfectly healthy left arm? What would happen to a man who went to a urologist, told him that he felt like a Christian trapped in a Jewish body, and asked him to re‐cover the glans of his penis with foreskin? (Such an operation may be alluded to in I Corinthians, 7:17‐18.) “But,” the medically informed reader might object, “isn't transsexualism a disease? Isn't it — in the grandly deceptive phrase of the American psychiatric establishment used to characterize all ‘mental diseases’ — ‘just like any other illness'?” No, it is not. The transsexual male is indistinguishable from other males, save by his desire to be a woman. ("He is a woman trapped in a man's body” is the standard rhetorical form of this claim.) If such a desire qualifies as a disease, transforming the desiring agent into a “transsexual,” then the old person who wants to be young is a “transchronological,” the poor person who wants to be rich is a “transeconomical,” and so on. Such hypothetical claims and the requests for “therapy” based on them (together with our cognitive and medical responses to them) frame, in my opinion, the proper background against which our contemporary beliefs and practices concerning “transsexualism” and transsexual “therapy” ought to be viewed.
Clearly, not all desires are authenticated in our society as diseases. Why the desire for a change in sex roles is so authenticated is analyzed with great sensitivity and skill by Janice Raymond in “The Transsexual Empire.” Arguing that “medicine and psychology ... function as secular religions in the area of transsexualism,” she demonstrates that this “condition” is now accepted as a disease because advances in the technology of sex‐conversion surgery have made certain alterations in the human genitals possible and because such operations reiterate and reinforce traditional patriarchal sex‐role expectations and stereotypes. Ostensibly, the “transsexers” (from psychologists to urologists) are curing a disease; actually, they engage in the religious and political shaping and controling of “masculine” and “feminine” behavior. Miss Raymond's development and documentation of this thesis is flawless. Her book Is an important achievement.
The claim that males can be transformed, by means of hormones and surgery, into females, and vice versa, is, of course, a lie. ("She‐males” are fabricated in much greater numbers than “he‐females.") Chromosomal sex is fixed. And so are one's historical experiences of growing up and living as boy or girl, man or woman. What, then, can be achieved by means of “transsexual therapy"? The language in which the reply is framed is crucial — and can never be neutral. The transsexual propagandists claim to transform “women trapped in men's bodies” into “real” women and want then to be accepted socially as females (say, in professional tennis). Critics of transsexualism contend that such a person is a “male‐to‐constructed‐female” (Miss Raymond's term), or a fake female, or a castrated male transvestite who wears not only feminine clothing but also feminine‐looking body parts. Miss Raymond quotes a Casablanca surgeon, who has operated on more than 700 American men, characterizing the transsexual transformation as follows: “I don't change men into women. I transform male genitals into genitals that have a female aspect. All the rest is in the patient's mind ".
Not quite. Some of the rest is in society's “mind.” For the fact is that Renee Richards was endorsed by Billie Jean King as a real woman and was accepted by the authorities monitoring women's professional tennis as a “real woman.” This authentication of a “constructed female” as a real female stands in dramatic contrast to the standard rules of Olympic competition in which the contestants’ bodily contours count for nothing, their sexual identity being based solely on their chromosomal makeup.
Miss Raymond has rightly seized on transsexualism as an emblem of modern society's unremitting — though increasingly concealed — antifeminism. And she correctly emphasizes that “the terminology of transsexualism disguises the reality ... that transsexuals ‘prove’ they are transsexuals by conforming to the canons of the medical‐psychiatric institution that evaluates them on the basis of their being able to pass as stereotypically masculine or feminine, and that ultimately grants surgery on this basis.” The “transsexual empire” is thus a Trojan horse in the battle between the sexes, helping men to seduce unsuspecting women, or women who ought to know better, to join forces with their oppressors.
Still, why should anyone (especially feminist women) object to men wanting to become women? Isn't imitation the highest form of flattery? Precisely herein lies the “liberal” sexologists’ betrayal of human dignity and integrity: They support the (male) transsexual's claim that he wants to be a woman — when, in fact, what he wants is to be a caricature of the male definition of “femininity.” What makes transsexual surgery a male‐supremacist obscenity is the fact that transsexing surgeons do not perform the operation on all clients (just for the money) but insist that the client prove that he can “pass” as a woman. That is as if Catholic priests were willing to convert only those Jews who could prove their Christianity by socially appropriate acts of antiSemitism. Janice Raymond's analysis is bitterly correct. The very existence of the “transsexual empire” is evidence of the persistence of our deep‐seated religious and cultural prejudices against woman.
The war between the sexes is a part of our, human heritage. It's no use denying It. If that war ever ends, it will be not because of a phony armistice arranged by doctors, but because men, women and children will place personal dignity before social sex‐role identity.
IN the old days, when I was a medical student, if a man wanted to have his penis amputated, my psychology professors said that he suffered from schizophrenia, locked him up in an asylum and threw away the key. Now that I am a professor. my colleagues in psychiatry say that he is a “transsexual,” my colleagues in urology refashion his penis into a perineal cavity they call a vagina, and Time magazine puts him on its cover and calls him “her.” Anyone who doubts that this is progress is considered to be ignorant of the discoveries of modern psychiatric sexology, and a political reactionary, a sexual bigot, or something equally unflattering.
Like much of the medical‐psychiatric mendacity characteristic of our day, the official definition “transsexualism” as a disease comes down to the strategic abuse of language — epitomized by confusing and equating biological phenomena with social roles (in the present case, chromosomal sexual identity with acting as a man or a woman). Although there are connections between these concepts and facts, neither one “causes'.’ or “determines” the other.
Because “transsexualism” involves, is indeed virtually synonymous with, extensive surgical alterations of the “normal” human body, we might ask what would happen, say, to a man who went to an orthopedic surgeon, told him that he felt like a right‐handed person trapped in an ambidextrous body and asked the doctor to cut off his perfectly healthy left arm? What would happen to a man who went to a urologist, told him that he felt like a Christian trapped in a Jewish body, and asked him to re‐cover the glans of his penis with foreskin? (Such an operation may be alluded to in I Corinthians, 7:17‐18.) “But,” the medically informed reader might object, “isn't transsexualism a disease? Isn't it — in the grandly deceptive phrase of the American psychiatric establishment used to characterize all ‘mental diseases’ — ‘just like any other illness'?” No, it is not. The transsexual male is indistinguishable from other males, save by his desire to be a woman. ("He is a woman trapped in a man's body” is the standard rhetorical form of this claim.) If such a desire qualifies as a disease, transforming the desiring agent into a “transsexual,” then the old person who wants to be young is a “transchronological,” the poor person who wants to be rich is a “transeconomical,” and so on. Such hypothetical claims and the requests for “therapy” based on them (together with our cognitive and medical responses to them) frame, in my opinion, the proper background against which our contemporary beliefs and practices concerning “transsexualism” and transsexual “therapy” ought to be viewed.
Clearly, not all desires are authenticated in our society as diseases. Why the desire for a change in sex roles is so authenticated is analyzed with great sensitivity and skill by Janice Raymond in “The Transsexual Empire.” Arguing that “medicine and psychology ... function as secular religions in the area of transsexualism,” she demonstrates that this “condition” is now accepted as a disease because advances in the technology of sex‐conversion surgery have made certain alterations in the human genitals possible and because such operations reiterate and reinforce traditional patriarchal sex‐role expectations and stereotypes. Ostensibly, the “transsexers” (from psychologists to urologists) are curing a disease; actually, they engage in the religious and political shaping and controling of “masculine” and “feminine” behavior. Miss Raymond's development and documentation of this thesis is flawless. Her book Is an important achievement.
The claim that males can be transformed, by means of hormones and surgery, into females, and vice versa, is, of course, a lie. ("She‐males” are fabricated in much greater numbers than “he‐females.") Chromosomal sex is fixed. And so are one's historical experiences of growing up and living as boy or girl, man or woman. What, then, can be achieved by means of “transsexual therapy"? The language in which the reply is framed is crucial — and can never be neutral. The transsexual propagandists claim to transform “women trapped in men's bodies” into “real” women and want then to be accepted socially as females (say, in professional tennis). Critics of transsexualism contend that such a person is a “male‐to‐constructed‐female” (Miss Raymond's term), or a fake female, or a castrated male transvestite who wears not only feminine clothing but also feminine‐looking body parts. Miss Raymond quotes a Casablanca surgeon, who has operated on more than 700 American men, characterizing the transsexual transformation as follows: “I don't change men into women. I transform male genitals into genitals that have a female aspect. All the rest is in the patient's mind ".
Not quite. Some of the rest is in society's “mind.” For the fact is that Renee Richards was endorsed by Billie Jean King as a real woman and was accepted by the authorities monitoring women's professional tennis as a “real woman.” This authentication of a “constructed female” as a real female stands in dramatic contrast to the standard rules of Olympic competition in which the contestants’ bodily contours count for nothing, their sexual identity being based solely on their chromosomal makeup.
Miss Raymond has rightly seized on transsexualism as an emblem of modern society's unremitting — though increasingly concealed — antifeminism. And she correctly emphasizes that “the terminology of transsexualism disguises the reality ... that transsexuals ‘prove’ they are transsexuals by conforming to the canons of the medical‐psychiatric institution that evaluates them on the basis of their being able to pass as stereotypically masculine or feminine, and that ultimately grants surgery on this basis.” The “transsexual empire” is thus a Trojan horse in the battle between the sexes, helping men to seduce unsuspecting women, or women who ought to know better, to join forces with their oppressors.
Still, why should anyone (especially feminist women) object to men wanting to become women? Isn't imitation the highest form of flattery? Precisely herein lies the “liberal” sexologists’ betrayal of human dignity and integrity: They support the (male) transsexual's claim that he wants to be a woman — when, in fact, what he wants is to be a caricature of the male definition of “femininity.” What makes transsexual surgery a male‐supremacist obscenity is the fact that transsexing surgeons do not perform the operation on all clients (just for the money) but insist that the client prove that he can “pass” as a woman. That is as if Catholic priests were willing to convert only those Jews who could prove their Christianity by socially appropriate acts of antiSemitism. Janice Raymond's analysis is bitterly correct. The very existence of the “transsexual empire” is evidence of the persistence of our deep‐seated religious and cultural prejudices against woman.
The war between the sexes is a part of our, human heritage. It's no use denying It. If that war ever ends, it will be not because of a phony armistice arranged by doctors, but because men, women and children will place personal dignity before social sex‐role identity.
=======================================================
In the above essay from 1979 Szasz points out the glaringly obvious.
What does it say about us that by 2018 doing so has become so controversial?
In the above essay from 1979 Szasz points out the glaringly obvious.
What does it say about us that by 2018 doing so has become so controversial?
3 April 2018
It is the case.
I wrote the following two comments under an article by the Critical Psychiatrist Joanna Moncrieff:
You write the following: “We should acknowledge, however, that neurological conditions cannot always be detected in the brain, and may only be identified through the characteristic way in which they are manifested in publicly observable behaviour. This does make judging what is and is not a brain disease a complex and imprecise matter in some cases.”
Surely a “neurological condition” is absolutely always potentially detectable in the brain (or nervous system) – by virtue of its being a physical neurological condition. What “is and is not a brain disease” is not really a question of judgement, but of science. Until a disease is categorically scientifically identified, how can it be said to exist at all?
Surely a “neurological condition” is absolutely always potentially detectable in the brain (or nervous system) – by virtue of its being a physical neurological condition. What “is and is not a brain disease” is not really a question of judgement, but of science. Until a disease is categorically scientifically identified, how can it be said to exist at all?
Also – how can a “neurological condition” be completely “identified” by its manifestation in behaviour? Surely this is a category error. Surely a “neurological condition” can only be fully and unequivocally identified by a physical examination of the B.C.N. – brain and central nervous system – of some kind.
Joanna Moncrieff's reply to my comments was as follows:
Hi citizen sofa,
This is not the case. Dementia, including Alzheimer’s disease, is not diagnosed by brain imaging or any other physical tests. As a group, people with a diagnosis of dementia have more of the brain pathology associated with aging than those who do not (plaques and tangles and infarcts identified in brain scans), but most people at a certain age have some of this pathology and there is overlap (ie. a person without dementia may have more pathology than an individual with it). Brain imaging cannot therefore be used to make a diagnosis, and no other physical tests specifically identify dementia either. Dementia is diagnosed by someone’s behaviour and performance on tests of cognitive function.
This is not the case. Dementia, including Alzheimer’s disease, is not diagnosed by brain imaging or any other physical tests. As a group, people with a diagnosis of dementia have more of the brain pathology associated with aging than those who do not (plaques and tangles and infarcts identified in brain scans), but most people at a certain age have some of this pathology and there is overlap (ie. a person without dementia may have more pathology than an individual with it). Brain imaging cannot therefore be used to make a diagnosis, and no other physical tests specifically identify dementia either. Dementia is diagnosed by someone’s behaviour and performance on tests of cognitive function.
I think people do not realise this because if you look at information on diagnosing dementia it is very vague and does not make this clear. When someone is being investigated for possible dementia, they will have various blood tests and other examinations, but these are for the purpose of excluding other diagnoses (like hypothyroidism) that may be producing the symptoms. Dementia is diagnosed when no other physical explanation of the symptoms (behaviour and cognitive deficits identified on testing) is found.
Source:
https://joannamoncrieff.com/2017/11/27/philosophy-part-6-are-mental-disorders-brain-diseases-in-waiting/
What I wrote in my comments is indeed the case, in spite of what she says above.
Her reply seems to ignore my basic point.
A neurological condition can indeed only be neurological.
Her reply seems to ignore my basic point.
A neurological condition can indeed only be neurological.
Her reply to my comment shows why Szasz's perspective is absolutely vital, even in areas that are not related to so-called "mental illness".
Szasz was a true upholder of the spirit of science and the Enlightenment.
Szasz was a true upholder of the spirit of science and the Enlightenment.
If dementia is merely degeneration then it is not strictly speaking - and hence not scientifically speaking - a disease. If dementia is not identified in pathology of some kind then it is not a disease - it is merely an observed behaviour.
If it is only observable in behaviour then we cannot say it exists at all. If and when that behaviour is demonstrated to have been directly caused by physical pathology, then we could possibly say that a behaviour has been caused by an illness. We can never say that a behaviour is an illness. It is indeed a category error.
I have already made a similar point in my blog on neuroscience.
[
http://nervescienceisnonsense.blogspot.co.uk/2014/05/clueless-about-alzheimers-disease.html
]
[
http://nervescienceisnonsense.blogspot.co.uk/2014/05/clueless-about-alzheimers-disease.html
]
Szasz's basic point is absolutely right and absolutely vital. A behaviour is not in itself a disease.
A diagnosis can only mean a disease in the light of the evidence of medical science.
My obvious point is that cancer - for example - would never be diagnosed solely on the basis of changed behaviour. Neither would treatment for it be initiated. You would not give someone oncological brain surgery, merely because they had slurred speech and were very confused. Cancer would only ever be diagnosed on the basis of scientific evidence. Neither should any other disease be diagnosed on the basis of anything other than scientific evidence.
My obvious point is that cancer - for example - would never be diagnosed solely on the basis of changed behaviour. Neither would treatment for it be initiated. You would not give someone oncological brain surgery, merely because they had slurred speech and were very confused. Cancer would only ever be diagnosed on the basis of scientific evidence. Neither should any other disease be diagnosed on the basis of anything other than scientific evidence.
If people need a diagnosis of dementia in order for them to receive the help they need, then I don't believe in sacrificing science for social reasons. If people need a diagnosis for social reasons, then we have a social problem, not necessarily a medical problem. Why should people need a diagnosis to get help? A diagnosis should be a scientific question and nothing else.
People should get all the help that they need. This applies to everyone and every possible problem. There is simply no need to sacrifice science to the social institution of what remains of the medical profession.
This compromising of science has been going on for too long. And Szasz seems to have been one of the few people aware of it.
People should get all the help that they need. This applies to everyone and every possible problem. There is simply no need to sacrifice science to the social institution of what remains of the medical profession.
This compromising of science has been going on for too long. And Szasz seems to have been one of the few people aware of it.
----------------------------------------------------------------
"The Critical Psychiatry Network's position is not in my view psychiatric criticism at all.
It is a plea for what I have long called prettifying the psychiatric plantation.
Psychiatrists either have the right to forcibly molest persons or they do not have such a right.
Some things are either-or. You are either arrested or not arrested.
You are either sitting here or you are in jail."
Thomas Szasz, 2011.
"The Critical Psychiatry Network's position is not in my view psychiatric criticism at all.
It is a plea for what I have long called prettifying the psychiatric plantation.
Psychiatrists either have the right to forcibly molest persons or they do not have such a right.
Some things are either-or. You are either arrested or not arrested.
You are either sitting here or you are in jail."
Thomas Szasz, 2011.
24 March 2018
Anarchism and socialism now?
My professed anarchism and socialism are not doctrinaire nor "trapped in ideology".
At the most basic, I see my commitment to anarchism and socialism as based in beliefs in both individual freedom and questioning of unjustified coercive power (in the case of anarchism) and social justice and equality (in the case of socialism).
I see them as essential principles and values in my politics.
Similarly I see my general belief in democracy as based on the general principle of freedom and opposition to tyranny, and not necessarily in conflict with a belief in libertarianism or anarchism.
I do of course realize that it does seem contradictory to profess anarchism at the same time as a belief in democracy, and I will write more about this at some point. I see SUBSIDIARITY and DEVOLUTION and GRASS ROOTS DEMOCRACY as important concepts in this regard - as ways of bringing individuals closer to decisions and policies that affect them.
I am also broadly speaking against extreme nationalism, but broadly speaking in favour of democracy, which is possibly another area of ideological conflict and contradiction.
I am not the kind of anarchist that doesn't vote on principle. On the contrary, I believe in voting on principle and I even believe it should be compulsory.
In Steven Pinker's book "Enlightenment Now", I was not fully convinced by his contention that "anarchy" - in the sense of pre-existing chaos and lack of government - is more violent than tyranny.
Even if this is in some sense true, this seems a minor point. I tend to agree with Thoreau that "that government is best which governs the least."
But I was overall very heartened by Pinker's chapter on Democracy and its progress since the Enlightenment and very much convinced by it.
Though he didn't seem to deal with the argument of thinkers like Chomsky that capitalism - private and business ownership and control of production - is in some ways antithetical to democracy.
I remain a Green and I do not think that Pinker successfully dealt with this ideology.
I see this as an example of CULTURAL LAG - where a culture "lags behind" its reality.
In this case it is a cultural lag regarding an ideology that is far more up to date and in tune with reality than Marxism or other nineteenth century ideologies.
I agree with Pinker that it is regrettable that Marxism still has so many adherents today, which I further see as an example of CULTURAL LAG.
I am a humanist environmentalist and I don't believe that Green politics is anti-human.
Green Politics
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Green_politics
I fully see Green politics as an outgrowth and development and part of the Enlightenment and not being in contradiction with it. It has undoubtedly had influences from Romanticism but I feel that it is fully part of the Enlightenment, and fully compatible with it.
I was glad that Pinker spoke approvingly of non-violence and pointed out that it can work.
At the most basic, I see my commitment to anarchism and socialism as based in beliefs in both individual freedom and questioning of unjustified coercive power (in the case of anarchism) and social justice and equality (in the case of socialism).
I see them as essential principles and values in my politics.
Similarly I see my general belief in democracy as based on the general principle of freedom and opposition to tyranny, and not necessarily in conflict with a belief in libertarianism or anarchism.
I do of course realize that it does seem contradictory to profess anarchism at the same time as a belief in democracy, and I will write more about this at some point. I see SUBSIDIARITY and DEVOLUTION and GRASS ROOTS DEMOCRACY as important concepts in this regard - as ways of bringing individuals closer to decisions and policies that affect them.
I am also broadly speaking against extreme nationalism, but broadly speaking in favour of democracy, which is possibly another area of ideological conflict and contradiction.
I am not the kind of anarchist that doesn't vote on principle. On the contrary, I believe in voting on principle and I even believe it should be compulsory.
In Steven Pinker's book "Enlightenment Now", I was not fully convinced by his contention that "anarchy" - in the sense of pre-existing chaos and lack of government - is more violent than tyranny.
Even if this is in some sense true, this seems a minor point. I tend to agree with Thoreau that "that government is best which governs the least."
But I was overall very heartened by Pinker's chapter on Democracy and its progress since the Enlightenment and very much convinced by it.
Though he didn't seem to deal with the argument of thinkers like Chomsky that capitalism - private and business ownership and control of production - is in some ways antithetical to democracy.
I remain a Green and I do not think that Pinker successfully dealt with this ideology.
I see this as an example of CULTURAL LAG - where a culture "lags behind" its reality.
In this case it is a cultural lag regarding an ideology that is far more up to date and in tune with reality than Marxism or other nineteenth century ideologies.
I agree with Pinker that it is regrettable that Marxism still has so many adherents today, which I further see as an example of CULTURAL LAG.
I am a humanist environmentalist and I don't believe that Green politics is anti-human.
Green Politics
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Green_politics
I fully see Green politics as an outgrowth and development and part of the Enlightenment and not being in contradiction with it. It has undoubtedly had influences from Romanticism but I feel that it is fully part of the Enlightenment, and fully compatible with it.
I was glad that Pinker spoke approvingly of non-violence and pointed out that it can work.
10 March 2018
"Civilisation: A Sceptic's View"
Very much enjoyed and learned from "Civilisation: A Sceptic's View" by David Cannadine on BBC Radio 4.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b09sn1hj
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b09sn1hj
8 March 2018
Excellent book - "Who Are We - and Should It Matter in the 21st Century?"
I read "Who Are We - and Should It Matter in the 21st Century?" by Gary Younge and it is an excellent book. I think he is sometimes a little too sympathetic to radical Islam for my liking. It was written nearly a decade ago now, but is still very relevant.
It has made me think about the issue of identity and identity politics. I am glad he is critical of Eric Hobsbawm's Marxist-inspired insistence that nationalism and identity are not major historical forces. But I hope they become less and less important and I think they will.
It has made me think about the issue of identity and identity politics. I am glad he is critical of Eric Hobsbawm's Marxist-inspired insistence that nationalism and identity are not major historical forces. But I hope they become less and less important and I think they will.
7 March 2018
"Enlightenment Now"
I just forked out the grand sum of twenty one pounds on a nice hardback edition of "Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism and Progress" by Steven Pinker. Which is not mentioning the trees used up! Looks good. I hope he spends all the royalties on something good! I am sure he will.
I believe in enlightenment and in The Enlightenment and I like the optimism - if only because as Winston Churchill said, there is no point being anything else other than an optimist.
He seems to include a belief in market economics with his vision of enlightened humanism, which I would perhaps take issue with.
As he himself notes, "intellectuals are apt to do a spit take when they read a defence of capitalism."
But I don't think this book is in its entirety a defence of capitalism, but a defence of the Enlightenment. And a very good one at that. In economic terms, I think it is as much a defence of development and social democracy, as of capitalism and free markets as such.
I am very much a supporter of Pinker's strong condemnation of Nietzsche and his continuing influence in particular. Freud needs a similar condemnation as well, if you ask me. And for similar reasons.
Freud's views were certainly a threat to reason, science, humanism and progress.
His influence is still a threat to reason, science, humanism and progress.
I must get round to actually reading it properly from cover to cover, hopefully some time in this century. If humanity does last out this century. Hopefully it will.
I have now read it from cover to cover and I am very glad I did. It is very good indeed.
Whilst I am very much inclined to take heed of George Monbiot's criticisms of the way the environment is dealt with in the book [ You can deny environmental calamity -until you check the facts." ], I still like what seems to be the message of the book overall. George Monbiot's words are a little too harsh in places I think; and this book is worth reading and not wholly discredited by a few mistakes or biases.
In particular, I wasn't convinced at all by Pinker's dismissal of the concept of "Sustainability".
We are indeed inevitably a part of the planet's ecosystem and he didn't really face up to that reality to a sufficient extent in my view. And I hope we have reached "Peak Car", but I don't know if we have.
The Ecosystem is not just another mythical "transcendent entity" like the "nation", as he infers - I think it is a valid and scientific concept.
I resent his accusation that so-called "Greenism" is "apocalyptic", but I was relieved to see his advocacy of Ecomodernism and Ecopragmatism, and of a more humanistic environmentalism.
However, I am not sure if these tendencies go far enough in humanity's imperative quest to achieve an ecological civilisation.
I am glad that he accepts that the environment is facing "serious problems", and I agree with his emphasis on Enlightenment optimism, even if things in this regard are perhaps not quite as rosy as he portrays them.
Though, along with George Monbiot, he has swayed me over the issue of nuclear power, which I now support, I remain a convinced Green and I resent his disparagement of that ideology.
On the question of psychology and psychiatry - he comes close to agreeing that psychiatry is over-diagnosing so-called "mental illness", but he still needs to open his eyes to the insult to the Enlightenment that Psychiatry represents. Psychiatry is undoubtedly an affront to reason, science, humanism and progress. I think Thomas Szasz (1920-2012) was a very important thinker on this question and others and was very much in the Enlightenment tradition, particularly with regard to supporting freedom and alleviating human suffering. I do like Pinker's emphasis on reducing suffering with regard to the question of psychology and throughout the book.
John Gray has written of the book "Enlightenment Now" - "To think of this book as any kind of scholarly exercise is a category mistake." This statement is just ridiculous bullshit. Yes the book is quite polemical, but it is a polemic that is undoubtedly backed up by scholarship.
I certainly believe in enlightenment and in The Enlightenment. And this book is a good manifesto for it and its continuation.
If people need something to believe in, I recommend this book - it is an eloquent riposte to religious and nationalist fundamentalism. I believe yet more in reason, science, humanism and progress. I think, however, that the environment is the biggest challenge faced by the Enlightenment and I was not entirely convinced by his coverage of this topic.
I was overall convinced by the book that many things have indeed got better since the Enlightenment, and that it is due to enlightenment and the Enlightenment. Ideas do indeed matter. I was further convinced that things can get better still.
I now plan to read George Monbiot's "Out of the Wreckage".
March 30th 2018.
I have now read George Monbiot's "Out of the Wreckage: A New Politics for an Age of Crisis" and I was very impressed.
This is an inspirational book that I think is more in the real world than Pinker's one and makes some real proposals for moving things forward to a better place for humanity.
I like his attack on the politics of selfishness, and his belief that humans are social beings that need to be altruistic and co-operate.
His book is a good basis on which to build progressive ideas.
I believe in enlightenment and in The Enlightenment and I like the optimism - if only because as Winston Churchill said, there is no point being anything else other than an optimist.
He seems to include a belief in market economics with his vision of enlightened humanism, which I would perhaps take issue with.
As he himself notes, "intellectuals are apt to do a spit take when they read a defence of capitalism."
But I don't think this book is in its entirety a defence of capitalism, but a defence of the Enlightenment. And a very good one at that. In economic terms, I think it is as much a defence of development and social democracy, as of capitalism and free markets as such.
I am very much a supporter of Pinker's strong condemnation of Nietzsche and his continuing influence in particular. Freud needs a similar condemnation as well, if you ask me. And for similar reasons.
Freud's views were certainly a threat to reason, science, humanism and progress.
His influence is still a threat to reason, science, humanism and progress.
I must get round to actually reading it properly from cover to cover, hopefully some time in this century. If humanity does last out this century. Hopefully it will.
I have now read it from cover to cover and I am very glad I did. It is very good indeed.
Whilst I am very much inclined to take heed of George Monbiot's criticisms of the way the environment is dealt with in the book [ You can deny environmental calamity -until you check the facts." ], I still like what seems to be the message of the book overall. George Monbiot's words are a little too harsh in places I think; and this book is worth reading and not wholly discredited by a few mistakes or biases.
In particular, I wasn't convinced at all by Pinker's dismissal of the concept of "Sustainability".
We are indeed inevitably a part of the planet's ecosystem and he didn't really face up to that reality to a sufficient extent in my view. And I hope we have reached "Peak Car", but I don't know if we have.
The Ecosystem is not just another mythical "transcendent entity" like the "nation", as he infers - I think it is a valid and scientific concept.
I resent his accusation that so-called "Greenism" is "apocalyptic", but I was relieved to see his advocacy of Ecomodernism and Ecopragmatism, and of a more humanistic environmentalism.
However, I am not sure if these tendencies go far enough in humanity's imperative quest to achieve an ecological civilisation.
I am glad that he accepts that the environment is facing "serious problems", and I agree with his emphasis on Enlightenment optimism, even if things in this regard are perhaps not quite as rosy as he portrays them.
Though, along with George Monbiot, he has swayed me over the issue of nuclear power, which I now support, I remain a convinced Green and I resent his disparagement of that ideology.
On the question of psychology and psychiatry - he comes close to agreeing that psychiatry is over-diagnosing so-called "mental illness", but he still needs to open his eyes to the insult to the Enlightenment that Psychiatry represents. Psychiatry is undoubtedly an affront to reason, science, humanism and progress. I think Thomas Szasz (1920-2012) was a very important thinker on this question and others and was very much in the Enlightenment tradition, particularly with regard to supporting freedom and alleviating human suffering. I do like Pinker's emphasis on reducing suffering with regard to the question of psychology and throughout the book.
John Gray has written of the book "Enlightenment Now" - "To think of this book as any kind of scholarly exercise is a category mistake." This statement is just ridiculous bullshit. Yes the book is quite polemical, but it is a polemic that is undoubtedly backed up by scholarship.
I certainly believe in enlightenment and in The Enlightenment. And this book is a good manifesto for it and its continuation.
If people need something to believe in, I recommend this book - it is an eloquent riposte to religious and nationalist fundamentalism. I believe yet more in reason, science, humanism and progress. I think, however, that the environment is the biggest challenge faced by the Enlightenment and I was not entirely convinced by his coverage of this topic.
I was overall convinced by the book that many things have indeed got better since the Enlightenment, and that it is due to enlightenment and the Enlightenment. Ideas do indeed matter. I was further convinced that things can get better still.
I now plan to read George Monbiot's "Out of the Wreckage".
March 30th 2018.
I have now read George Monbiot's "Out of the Wreckage: A New Politics for an Age of Crisis" and I was very impressed.
This is an inspirational book that I think is more in the real world than Pinker's one and makes some real proposals for moving things forward to a better place for humanity.
I like his attack on the politics of selfishness, and his belief that humans are social beings that need to be altruistic and co-operate.
His book is a good basis on which to build progressive ideas.
Two superb books.
"At the Existentialist Café: Freedom, Being, and Apricot Cocktails" and "How to Live: A Life of Montaigne in One Question and Twenty Attempts at an Answer" by Sarah Bakewell are both simply superb books.
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